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ABSTRACT
South Africa’s participation in World War II was accompanied by a specific and, to some extent, par-
adoxical development. The declaration of war on Germany alongside Great Britain and other domin-
ions was preceded by a government crisis that resulted in the collapse of Hertzog’s cabinet. The new 
coalition government led by Hertzog’s long-time political rival Jan Smuts had to face strong nation-
alist opposition. This opposition supported by Nazi Germany was extensive but fragmented, causing 
it to be defeated in the 1943 elections. However, this defeat led to a paradoxical result. The ultra-con-
servative and fiercely anti-British politician D.F. Malan became the undisputed leader of the oppo-
sition and capitalized on his position to clinch an electoral victory in 1948.
The goal of this paper is to identify the reasons for this paradoxical development based on the 
analysis of both the activities of various opposition groups and personal animosities among their 
leaders. The analysis is based on the existing literature as well as on archival materials, in particular 
the reports of South African counterintelligence.
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“WHITE UNITY”
The period after 1910 until the mid-30s in the Union’s political development is char-
acterized by Afrikaners’ rising influence. Although English-speaking white South 
Africans represented about 40 percent of the Union’s white population, their impact 
on politics gradually declined as they focused mainly on the economy.2 It should be 
noted that there was no “British” political party on the South African political scene 
that might have constituted an adequate rival to the Afrikaner nationalists.
1 Mikuláš Touška, Department of  Global History, Faculty of  Arts, Charles University, 
Náměstí Jana Palacha 1/2, 116 38 Prague, Czech Republic, mikulas.touska@gmail.com
2 A. STEWARD, The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis, 1938–39, in: The 
English Historical Review, Vol. 123, No. 503 (August 2008), p. 948.
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Afrikaner nationalism was of particular importance to South Africa’s political 
scene. However, this concept should not be confused with Afrikanerdom, a complex 
and eclectic phenomenon that combines the Christian values of Calvinism, pride in 
historical traditions, the Great Trek (Die Groot Trek), but also the republican tradition 
and the fight against British imperialism and, last but not least, linguistic and cultural 
exceptionalism.3 While Afrikanerdom is essentially a homogeneous category, Afrikaner 
nationalism takes many forms that derive from specific goals and needs. Different and 
often hostile groups of nationalists have habitually claimed the position of the only 
true representative of Afrikaner values.4 By the mid-1930s, three principal streams 
of Afrikaner nationalism gradually formed in the South African political landscape. 
The first one was represented by Louis Botha and his South African Party (Suid-Af-
rikaanse Party), whose leadership was taken over by Jan Smuts after Botha’s prema-
ture death in 1919. To call this party nationalist is somewhat misleading, because 
while its main theme was the equality of Afrikaners with the British, its political 
agenda was based on the Union’s position as an integral part of the British Empire. 
As a result, the party also appealed to a large proportion of English-speaking voters. 
The belief in the Union’s limited sovereignty and its dependence on Great Britain’s 
foreign policies was fully reflected in 1914, when the government led by Louis Botha 
supported the declaration of war on Germany, suppressed the Boer rebellion against 
this move, and sent South African troops to fight the Germans in German-controlled 
South-West Africa (currently Namibia).
James Barry Hertzog and his National Party (Nasionale Party) formed in 1914 rep-
resented the second form of “nationalism”. Hertzog, originally a prominent member 
of the South African Party, left Botha’s government to protest the declaration of war 
on Germany. The National Party led by him was purely Afrikaner, and the aim of its 
policy was to strengthen Afrikaners’ national identity and gain greater Union auton-
omy. General Hertzog became Prime Minister in 1924 and remained in office for 15 
long years. Although he questioned the Union’s dependent position within the British 
Empire and was a Republican5, his policies never departed from the constitutional 
framework of the Union as a dominion. Despite all his efforts in the field of Afrikaner 
culture and language, he also respected English-speaking South Africans’ rights in 
the constitutional and political system of the Union.6 
The instability of the coalition of the National Party and the Labour Party (Arbei-
dersparty) and the impact of the economic crisis in the early 1930s led Hertzog and 
3 S. UYS, Apartheid: Opium of the Afrikaner, Transition, No. 19 (1965), p. 14; S. DUBOW, Afri-
kaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of ‘Race’, in: the Journal of African 
History, Volume 33, No. 2 (1992), pp. 235–236.
4 See for example D. O’MEARA: The Afrikaner Broederbond 1927–1948: Class Vanguard of Af-
rikaner Nationalism, in: Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 3, No. 2 (April 1977), 
pp. 157–158.
5 In the South African context, the concept of republicanism is rather different from the 
general understanding and refers primarily to the former Boer republics. South Afri-
can “Republicans” set South Africa’s full independence from Britain as the ultimate goal, 
which was eventually achieved in 1961.
6 K. KIRKWOOD, The Constitutional Crisis in South Africa, in: International Affairs (Royal In-
stitute of International Affairs 1944–), Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1952), pp. 433–434
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Smuts to take a radical step for their parties, forming the United Party (Vereenigde 
Party) in 1934, which completely dominated the House of Assembly. In the last pre-
war elections of 1938, the United Party won a total of 111 seats out of 150. The link 
between the two main streams of Afrikaner politics was the recognized need for so-
called “white unity”. But there was still a fundamental contradiction in their concep-
tions of the Union’s position in the Commonwealth.
Hertzog’s emphasis on preserving South Africa’s then current formal status, as well 
as the issue of the British’s position in South African politics, and, above all, the plan 
to connect with his biggest opponent, General Smuts, led to a rift within the National 
Party and the emergence of a third mainstream nationalist party in the 1930s. This 
split culminated after the founding of the United Party when D. F. Malan and his allies 
from the National Party, especially from the Cape, rejected this “great experiment”, 
which Malan described as a bulwark of imperialism and capitalism, and formed the 
opposition Purified National Party (Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party — GNP).7 This party, 
with its fiercely anti-British, nationalist and Republican agenda, as substantially re-
structured in the 1940s, represented the main opposition force during the war.8
ATTITUDES TOWARDS GERMANY
The United Party was the result of a compromise, so it is understandable that there 
were many contradictions between the two leaders. In addition to the relationship 
with the British Empire, there was no unity between Hertzog and Smuts on the fun-
damental issue of the relationship with Nazi Germany and the Union’s position in the 
event of a conflict between Germany and Great Britain. Like their constituents, the 
two wings of the United Party were divided on this issue.9
Both Smuts and Hertzog shared sympathy for Germany to some extent, but their 
views were vastly different when it came to the relationship with the Nazi regime. 
Smuts considered Nazism the dangerous consequence of an unfair post-World War 
I arrangement. Although he considered the Nazi regime abhorrent, he believed in 
the possibility of a permanent compromise between Berlin and London, until the 
rest of Czechoslovakia was occupied in March 1939.10 Hertzog, on the other hand, 
had expressed some sympathy before the war for Nazism, in which he saw the le-
gitimate reaction of the humiliated German nation, and was unreservedly opposed 
to the Union’s involvement in the war between Britain and Germany. But they both 
realized that a possible conflict with the Third Reich would inevitably mean a conflict 
within the Afrikaner population, part of which made no efforts to hide its sympathy 
for Nazi ideology and indeed also its antipathy to the British Empire. Smuts, who 
had long held pro-British positions, was convinced that, regardless of the risk of 
7 H. GILIOMIE, The Afrikaners — Biography of a People, London, 2003, pp. 408–409.
8 E. A. TIRYAKIAN, Apartheid and Politics in South Africa, in: The Journal of Politics, Volume 
22, No. 4 (November 1960), pp. 684–685.
9 R. DAVENPORT, C. SAUNDERS, South Africa, A Modern History, London 2000, p. 343.
10 J. VAN DER POEL, Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume VI, Cambridge 1973, pp. 139–140; 
155–156.
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 compromising the unity of South African society, it was essential that the Union en-
tered the war alongside Great Britain and other dominions.11 One specific fact played 
a key role in the consideration of its position on the war. Since 1915, the Union had 
been entrusted with the administration of the mandate territory of German South-
West Africa, and the government did not want Germany to regain this colony as a re-
sult of a compromise with Great Britain or a victory in the war.
In addition, Germany was an important trading partner for the Union. Trade had 
resumed in the 1920s and Germany gradually became an important market for South 
African raw materials exports as well as a supplier of industrial products. Already 
in 1928, a trade agreement was signed, supplemented in 1934 by a so-called “Barter 
Agreement”, which facilitated the exchange of goods between the two countries.12 
The fastest growing export commodity was raw wool, a product important to Afri-
kaner farmers. Germany then exported industrial products with higher added value 
to South Africa, in particular locomotives, machinery, cars and aircraft for civil trans-
port. As regards the latter, in the late 1930s, the German manufacturer Junkers essen-
tially became almost a monopoly supplier of aircraft for South African Airlines. The 
planned import of German weapons was suspended as a result of increasing tensions 
between Britain and Germany.13 In 1938, trade with Germany accounted for 18.8 per-
cent of Union exports and 7.9 percent of its imports.14 It is therefore clear that, in view 
of the importance of trade between them, there was also an economically motivated 
interest in maintaining neutrality in the second half of the 1930s.
NEUTRALITY CRISIS AND THE FALL OF HERTZOG’S CABINET
Great Britain expected that if it declared war on Germany, its dominions (with the 
exception of Ireland) would join it without delay, as they had in 1914. This was indeed 
important not only for reasons of a military and economic nature, but, of course, 
also as a symbol of the unity of the empire and its strength in the conflict that looked 
likely to arise. Indeed, Canada, Australia and New Zealand met these expectations 
and their governments, and in the case of Canada and New Zealand, also their parlia-
ments, encountered no controversy.15
11 DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, pp. 342–343.
12 However, it was not a typical exchange of ‘goods for goods’ arrangement, but a system that 
guaranteed the sale of a certain volume of South African wool and other raw materials and 
the possibility of offsetting the receivables from these transactions against the payment 
obligations arising from the purchase of industrial products from Germany. This contract 
was then amended five times, to the extent that just before the war its value was £3.7 mil-
lion. W. KIENZLE, German-South African Trade Relations in the Nazi Era, in: African Affairs, 
Volume 78, No. 310 (January 1979), pp. 82–83.
13 Ibid., pp. 88–89.
14 L. L. ILSLEY, The War Policy of South Africa, in: The American Political Science Review, Vol-
ume 34, No. 6 (December 1940), p. 1184.
15 The Parliaments of Canada and New Zealand, as well as their governments, decided unan-
imously to enter the war, see L. ROVNÁ, M. JINDRA, Dějiny Kanady, Praha 2000, p. 210; 
The Times (6.9.1939).
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As far as the Union’s position was concerned, the issue was far more complex, 
and it must be said that the British government had long been somewhat naive about 
the possibility that the Union could remain neutral. This is despite the fact that, for 
several years before the outbreak of the conflict, British officials had received re-
ports on the anti-British attitudes of a number of politicians, as well as part of the 
Afrikaner public, and their sympathy for Nazi Germany. As indicated above, both the 
government and the Union parliament were divided into two groups of about equal 
number on the position regarding the possible war against Germany.16 MPs from the 
former South African Party led by J. Smuts, and supported by the Labour Party and 
the Dominion Party, were in favour of the declaration of war, while a faction of the 
United Party, led by Prime Minister Hertzog, and backed by Malan’s GNP, pursued 
neutrality.17
After Great Britain, together with France, in response to the attack on Poland, 
declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, it became obvious that the Union had 
to decide on participation or non-participation in the conflict. The government met 
on this issue on the same day. However, contrary to Hertzog’s expectations, there was 
a serious split during the session. While the Prime Minister, with the support of five 
ministers,18 was in favour of neutrality, the second group, i.e. a total of seven cabinet 
members led by General Smuts, was in favour of the declaration of war. Hence on the 
same day the Prime Minister informed Governor General Patrick Duncan that the 
government was unable to reach a compromise on the issue of war and that he would 
submit this issue to the House of Assembly for a vote. He was also confident that his 
neutrality proposal would be supported by the necessary majority, but in the event 
that it was not, or if the majority was tight, he would resign as Prime Minister, ask the 
governor to dissolve parliament and call elections. However, the Governor-General 
left the question of the possible dissolution of parliament for a period after the vote.19
On the morning of 4 September 1939, General Hertzog, on behalf of the govern-
ment, submitted a motion to the House of Assembly to approve the neutrality policy. 
In its justification, it referred to the fact that the Union, as a sovereign country should 
only be involved in war if the conflict affected its interests. However, as the state of 
war between the United Kingdom and Germany concerned European affairs, the Un-
ion should remain neutral, provided that it would honour all its obligations to Britain 
and other Commonwealth countries.20
The leader of the opposition group in government, General Smuts, put forward an 
alternative proposal that obliged the government to sever ties with Germany, to reject 
16 STEWARD, pp. 953–959.
17 The Times (5.9.1939).
18 These ministers were: Minister of Finance Nicolaas Havenga, Minister of Defence and, at 
the same time, Minister of Trade and Industry Oswald Pirow, Minister of Railways and 
Ports Adriaan Fourie, Minister of Lands General Jan Kemp and Minister of Education and 
Minister of Native Affairs and Minister of Social Affairs Henry Fagan.
19 National Archives Repository, Pretoria (NAR), Volume No. 1126, Ref. 23/800A, Memoran-
dum — Governor General of South Africa (4.9.1939).
20 This included, in particular, the functioning and defence of Simon’s Town used by the Brit-
ish Navy in protecting the sea route around Africa.
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any form of neutrality in the conflict, and to honour all obligations to Britain and 
other Commonwealth countries. Furthermore, the government would be obliged to 
take all measures to defend the Union and its interests, on the condition that military 
units were not deployed outside South Africa, as was the case in the previous war. 
The proposal was based, inter alia, on the view that, if the Union were to stand aside 
in this war, it would breach its obligations to other Commonwealth members. The 
moral dimension of the whole issue was included in the last point of Smuts’ proposal: 
“The House of Assembly is deeply convinced that the freedom and independence of 
the Union is at stake in this conflict and that it is its true interest to oppose the use of 
force as a policy instrument”. Since even Smuts’ proposal did not foresee an active 
deployment of the armed forces, the dispute was conducted on an ideological level 
rather than on practical issues.21 However, as subsequent developments showed, the 
Union gradually became more involved in the war effort alongside Britain and its 
allies than Smuts’ proposal had anticipated.22
The lengthy and tumultuous discussion of parliament resulted in a vote in which 
the House supported the declaration of war. The pro-British group, led by General 
Smuts, won by a tight majority of 13 votes. Only 66 United Party MPs supported 
by all Labour Party and Dominion Party representatives voted in favour of Smuts’ 
 proposal.23
General Hertzog tried to salvage the situation by appealing to the Governor Gen-
eral’s office immediately after the vote and requesting the dissolution of the House 
on the grounds that the vote did not reflect the public’s will. Sir Patrick postponed 
his official decision until the following morning, however it was obvious that the dis-
solution of the House resulting in a general election was not in the British govern-
ment’s interest. For this reason he told Prime Minister Hertzog that should general 
Smuts be able to form a new government that would gain confidence in the House 
of Assembly, he would not dissolve the House. Immediately after the meeting, the 
Governor General met with Smuts who asked him for a mandate to form a new coali-
tion government supported by the Labour Party and the Dominion Party. The Gover-
nor General promptly complied with this request and informed General Hertzog of 
this fact the following morning in a letter.24 Hertzog had no choice but to tender his 
resignation, which was accepted immediately after the creation of Smuts’ first war 
cabinet on 6 September. From that day on, the Union was also at war with Germany.25 
Winston Churchill (then the First Lord of the Admiralty) demonstrated the relief that 
21 NAR Volume No. 1126, Ref. 23/800A, Memorandum — Governor General of South Africa 
(4.9.1939), Continuation of Memorandum of 4th September 1939 — Governor General of 
South Africa (6.9.1939).
22 During the war, South African Armed Forces played an important role during various cam-
paigns in Somalia, Ethiopia, North Africa and Italy.
23 NAR Volume No. 1126, Ref. 23/800A, (4.9.1939), Continuation of Memorandum of 4th Sep-
tember 1939 — Governor General of South Africa (6.9.1939).
24 Ibid., Annexure A
25 Ibid., Annexures B — E, Telegram — From Governor General for His Majesty the King 
(6.9.1939); NAR, Volume No. 1126, Ref. 23/800A, Order of Precedent of Cabinet Minis-
ters, P.M. 92/22/3 (11.9.1939); Proclamation No. 197, 1939, Department of the Prime Min-
ister and for External Affairs — Notice No. 1344, (6.9.1939).
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certainly prevailed on the part of the British government in his telegram to General 
Smuts the following day, when he stated: “I rejoice to feel that we are once again on 
commando together”.26
The dramatic developments around the vote to declare war marked the end of 
“white unity” whose main instrument had been the (now divided) United Party. Thus, 
the Union entered the war in a situation where both white South Africans and politi-
cal representation were divided into two almost equal groups. Moreover, the anti-war 
camp may have had a legitimate feeling that the declaration of war on Germany and 
the formation of a war cabinet led by General Smuts had been unconstitutional, be-
cause there were certainly reasons for the dissolution of the House.27
The epilogue of the vote on neutrality was a parliamentary debate on 1 April 1940. 
General Hertzog accused Smuts and other members of the last pre-war cabinet of 
violating an alleged agreement that the Union would remain neutral in the event of 
war in Europe. He claimed that on 19 September 1938, he had formulated a memoran-
dum which he had discussed with General Smuts, Finance Minister Nicolaas Havenga 
and Defence Minister Oswald Pirow, who had allegedly expressed their agreement 
with it. Thereafter, General Hertzog had allegedly had the memorandum approved 
by the cabinet at a government meeting on 28 September 1938, which dealt with 
the Sudetenland crisis. Both Smuts and the other members of the pre-war cabinet 
(R. Stuttaford, D. Reitz, and H. G. Lawrence) rejected these claims. General Hertzog 
had subsequently eased and relativized his accusations by stating that the proposed 
neutrality was aproved by the cabinet tacitly in late September 1938 and he assumed 
that this consent was still valid in early September of the following year.28 This debate 
may seem to have been pointless, but it illustrates Hertzog’s relentless efforts to end 
the Union’s participation in the war.
HERTZOG’S EFFORTS TO END THE WAR
Thus, the Union entered the war against Germany in a very difficult position. Un-
ion Defence Forces (UDF) were in a disappointing state.29 The government also had 
to take a number of economic and security measures, which were certainly not 
popular. However, in the autumn of 1939, the opposition to the war among South 
Africans was not as strong as the nationalists could have hoped for in the light of 
a close September parliamentary vote. Public opinion of the white population was 
essentially on the government’s side. According to official estimates, around half of 
Afrikaners and the vast majority of English speakers (in total representing around 
seventy percent of South Africans of European descent) supported participation in 
26 Churchill was most likely referring to his joint work with General Smuts in the War Cab-
inet during the First World War, VAN DER POEL, p. 191.
27 ILSLEY pp. 1181–1182.
28 VAN DER POEL, pp. 190–191.
29 At the outbreak of war, the ground forces had only 3,300 men, there was a deficit of 
39,000 trained reserves, and the Air Force had only five modern aircraft imported from 
Britain, see J. MERVIS, South Africa in World War II, Johannesburg, 1989, pp. 7–9.
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the war.30 Regardless of the support of public opinion, the war cabinet had to pass 
two tests of the coalition’s strength in a vote in the House of Assembly.
Despite his defeat in the vote on neutrality in September 1939, General Hertzog 
still believed that he could reverse the situation. Therefore, on 24 January 1940 he 
submitted to the House a draft of the following resolution: “The Chamber of Deputies 
is of the opinion that the time has come for the war with Germany to end and peace 
to be established”. As expected, Prime Minister Smuts put forward an alternative 
proposal that the Union should remain in the war that Germany had begun and was 
continuing, with a unyielding disregard for international law and that the Union 
would seek peace, but not on a separate basis. Both arguments were very similar to 
those made by the opposing sides in September the year before. 31 However, not all 
opposition MPs agreed unreservedly with what General Hertzog presented, in par-
ticular a number of them did not identify with his open support for Adolf Hitler. The 
parliamentary debate was very emotional, with nationalist MPs accusing General 
Smuts of destroying “white unity”, forcibly suppressing opposition views and ille-
gally interning uncomfortable people. Before the vote, the House sat continuously 
for more than 24 hours. Despite all of Smuts’ fears and pressure from the opposition, 
in the vote on 27 January the House approved Smuts’ proposal by 81 votes (59 votes 
were against), a majority much more pronounced than in September of the previous 
year.32 The government subsequently gained sufficient support for an important leg-
islative measure granting it some extraordinary powers and immunity, which Smuts 
considered extremely important.33
Another test of support for the war effort was the by-elections and elections to 
provincial councils in the spring of 1940. While the Nationalists retained their ma-
jority in the Cape, the other two provinces were won by United Party candidates who 
supported Smuts’ cabinet. This election only confirmed the trend that was evident 
back in January in the vote on ending the war with Germany.34
The military defeat of France in June 1940 led to increased pressure from the Na-
tionalists to end the Union’s participation in the war. The government, no doubt dis-
appointed with the course of the war so far and blaming Britain for military and 
political failure, realized the surrender of France would have a certain impact on 
the mood of the Union’s population. Moreover, it was also impossible to ignore the 
immediate change of course in the policy of the Vichy government’s relations with 
Germany and the United Kingdom and its allies and the related change in the situa-
tion in the French colonies in Africa.35
30 As mentioned above, the share between Afrikaners and English speakers was approxi-
mately 3:2, ILSLEY, pp. 1184–1185.
31 The Star (25.1.1940).
32 VAN DER POEL, p. 211; The Star, Rand Daily Mail (24–27.1.1940)
33 This was War Measures Act No. 13 of April 1940, which authorized the government to is-
sue so-called war measures with the power of law without the consent of parliament, VAN 
DER POEL, p. 211.
34 ILSLEY, pp. 1184–1185.
35 South African National Defence Force Archives, Pretoria (SANDFA), AI GP1, Box 19 File 
(10) I 18A, Censorship Report (undated).
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Smuts tried to find a modus vivendi with the opposition that would eliminate  ex-
tremism from both sides and called upon general Hertzog for consultation on 13 June 
1940. Hertzog however refused this offer and on 17 June addressed Prime Minister 
Smuts in a letter urging him to take all necessary steps to end the state of war and en-
sure peace for the Union. 36 Hertzog’s arguments were understandably primarily based 
on recent German military successes in Europe. The war seemed to be clearly evolv-
ing to the detriment of Smuts’ war time policy. Notwithstanding the fact that Smuts 
was aware of the critical war situation and felt a certain fatalism, Hertzog’s demands 
were resolutely rejected.37 In his rather emotional response three days later, Smuts 
recalled that the former Prime Minister had submitted this “disrespectful proposal” 
to the House in January already, and that the House had rejected it. He added that the 
neutrality proposed by Hertzog could not guarantee the Union’s independence, just 
as it did not ensure the independence of Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Nether-
lands. Smuts also sent a copy of his response to the press.38
It became clear that no form of co-operation between Smuts and Hertzog was 
possible any longer. At the end of August 1940, the former Prime Minister made a last 
attempt to push for an end to the Union’s participation in the war in the Chamber of 
Deputies. This time, he also supported his proposal by submitting a petition signed 
by nearly 150,000 women calling for an end to the war. In his speech in the House 
of Commons, he compared Great Britain to a boxer who is so shaken that he cannot 
grasp that he has already lost the match. He claimed the Union should throw in the 
towel for him.39 However, even this time it was the former Prime Minister who was 
left defeated. His motion was rejected by a majority of 18 votes.40
In December 1940, General Hertzog retired in response to the failure of his plan to 
unify the nationalist parliamentary opposition. This ended the former Prime Minis-
ter’s efforts to change the Union’s position in the war.
While Smuts was unable to find a modus vivendi with the opposition during this 
period (or later), it showed that he could rely on both United Party MPs as well as his 
coalition partners when voting in the House.
EFFORTS TO UNITE THE MALANITES AND HERTZOG’S OPPOSITION
After the declaration of war on Germany and the creation of Smuts’ war cabinet with 
the support of the Labour Party and the Dominion Party, the United Party rapidly 
eroded. Although Smuts officially retained the party leadership and controlled its 
apparatus, 37 MPs who voted against the war switched to the opposition. This group 
around former Prime Minister Hertzog almost immediately left the United Party and 
formed a new People’s Party (Volksparty).
36 VAN DER POEL, pp. 231–233.
37 Ibid., pp. 227–230.
38 Ibid., pp. 237–238.
39 The Star (30.8.1940).
40 SANDFA, UWH Box 243 file B.I.5 — Telegram to the British Government (2.9.1940); Rand 
Daily Mail and The Star (27.8. –2.9.1940).
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The fragile parliamentary majority, the unsatisfactory state of the UDF, unfortu-
nate developments on the European battlefields and the resistance of a significant 
portion of the public against the war, had raised understandable concerns. On the 
other hand, it was favourable for the Prime Minister and his allies that there was 
no perfect consensus between opposition groups. Smuts himself was not very con-
cerned about a strong coalition of the opposition forces represented by Hertzog and 
Malan supporters.41
Both Malan and Hertzog however hoped for a reversal by voting in the House, 
realising that in order to exert effective pressure on Smuts’ cabinet, they had to work 
together, preferably within a single political party. While their supporters agreed 
from the outset that the Union must end its participation in the conflict without 
delay, there were contradictions in two areas in particular. The first was Malan’s 
programme of constitutional changes, in particular the transformation of the Union 
into a republic, which was promoted mainly by the well-known Germanophile and 
former Defence Minister in Hertzog’s cabinet, Oswald Pirow. For Hertzog and his 
supporters, the programme was too radical, although in the long run they would 
probably support such change.42 The second area was the question of the exclusivity 
of Afrikaners and their relationship with the English-speaking part of the white 
South African minority. Hertzog advocated linguistic, cultural and political equal-
ity between the two groups, and his programme addressed both Afrikaners and the 
British. This was contrary to the views of the strong wing of the radical national-
ists of the Orange Free State (Oranje-Vrystaat), who formed an important group that 
D. F. Malan relied on.43
Despite these fundamental differences of opinion, both Hertzog and Malan sought 
to unite their followers under the wings of a single party. The merger was completed 
on 29 January 1940 by setting up a new opposition party under the somewhat strange 
name of the Reunited National Party or People’s Party (Herenigde Nasionale Party of 
Volksparty — HNP). Nominally, general Hertzog was the leader of this party, but this 
new grouping was very unstable. Though Hertzog had experience with a similar sit-
uation, gained after the formation of the United Party, this time the opposition to him 
was too strong.
On 5 November 1940, the HNP Congress opened in Bloemfontein, where its pro-
gramme was to be discussed and approved. From the beginning, General Hertzog 
faced criticism from the Orange Free State representatives, who expressed particu-
lar concern about the consequences of granting rights to English speakers, as envis-
aged by Hertzog’s programme. In the end, Hertzog’s programme was not discussed at 
all despite all Malan’s efforts to reconcile the two camps, to which the former Prime 
Minister responded with his resignation. On the second day of the congress, he and 
several of his supporters left the congress and in December founded a new so-called 
Afrikaner Party (Afrikanerparty). After Hertzog’s resignation, D. F. Malan logically 
returned to the position of leader of the HNP.44
41 VAN DER POEL, p. 200.
42 ILSLEY, p. 1182.
43 DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, pp. 346–347.
44 Ibid., pp. 347–349; SANDFA — AI GP1, Box 69 File (10) I 4 Censorship Report (10.1.1941).
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General Hertzog withdrew from politics shortly after these events and in Decem-
ber 1940 resigned his parliamentary seat. At the end of Hertzog’s political career, 
Smuts made a generous gesture when, on 13 December 1940 in a personal letter sent 
to his long-term political rival, he offered to propose to the parliament a pension for 
Hertzog in connection with his departure from political life. 45 Indeed, in January 
1941, parliament granted it to Hertzog as an award for almost half a century of service 
to the country.46 General Hertzog died in November 1942.
General Hertzog’s departure from the political scene was a turning point for the 
nationalist opposition. Despite all the peripeteia of subsequent developments, the 
HNP, led again by D. F. Malan, established itself as the leading force of the Afrikaner 
movement. It is noteworthy that, unlike General Smuts’ own assessment, this devel-
opment was very accurately appraised in a January 1941 dispatch by Paul Trompke, 
the German Consul General in Mozambique and an important figure in German se-
cret operations in the region.47
MALAN AND PIROW
Further disintegration of the Afrikaner movement continued after the rift between 
the Malanites and Hertzog’s supporters appeared. Malan’s leadership was first and 
foremost complicated by the radical and pro-Nazi oriented opposition within the 
party, led by Oswald Pirow.
The programme of this group was primarily based on Pirow’s pamphlet New Or-
der for South Africa (Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika) from 1940, which also gave the group 
its name. Although the original programme was inspired by the Salazar regime in 
Portugal, its starting point was anti-capitalist and Christian-Republican, but grad-
ually the speeches of members of the New Order became increasingly inspired by 
national socialism.48 But despite considerable support, especially in the Transvaal, 
Pirow (unlike other opposition leaders) did not question Malan’s position as party 
leader, and Malan also tried to persuade Pirow that the New Order would only func-
tion as a platform within the HNP. But these efforts were considered empty gestures 
by the radical members of this opposition faction, and the ongoing tension between 
the New Order and Malan’s HNP leadership led to the New Order’s closer cooperation 
with the Ossewabrandwag (OB) mass movement.49
Pirow did not attempt to turn his group into a new political party, but he believed 
that with the support of the OB, of which he was a member, he would succeed in the 
elections planned for 1943. Gradually, the New Order became the group which for-
mulated the ideology and programme of the OB.50 The close connection between the 
45 VAN DER POEL, p. 266.
46 The Special Pension Act No. 2 of 1941.
47 SANDFA, AI GP1, Box 69 File (10) I 44, Censorship Report (10.1.1941).
48 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, Union of South Africa Intelligence Records Bureau 
Summary (IRBS) No. 15 (10.2.1942).
49 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 10 (14.10.1942).
50 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 21 (September 3, 1942).
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New Order and OB finally led to candidates of the New Order not being included in 
the HNP list of candidates, and to them running independently and eventually failing 
completely in the 1943 elections.51
THE AFRIKANER BROEDERBOND
In analysing the Afrikaner opposition in this period, the somewhat mysterious phe-
nomenon of the Afrikaner Broederbond cannot be avoided. The influence of this se-
cret organization (since 1921) has so far been the subject of debate without a clear 
conclusion.52 The prevailing and somewhat simplistic view that it was a secret part 
of the National Party was already held by Smuts.53 However, it is clear that the phe-
nomenon of the Bond’s influence on the Afrikaner movement is more structured. The 
Bond was primarily an influence group that brought together Afrikaner elites to in-
fluence political concepts and coordinate the activities of diverse factions. It thus in-
terfered with politics, the trade union movement and the Union’s economy.54
It seems to be rather clear however that the Bond supported efforts to unify op-
position to Smuts’ war cabinet from the outset. An example of this support was the 
mass gathering organized by the Bond through the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural 
Associations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigin) as early as on 9 September 
1939. The event was welcomed as a symbol of the union of the opposition by 37 mem-
bers of the United Party, headed by General Hertzog, who voted against declaring 
war on Germany. Notwithstanding the fact that one of the Bond’s main themes was 
republicanism, to which General Hertzog stood at best reservedly.55
The Bond’s efforts to integrate the opposition going into the 1943 elections were 
particularly evident in the person of one of its prominent members, Professor du 
Plessis, who was the inspiration behind and became the chairman of the Afrikaner 
Unity Committee (Afrikaner Eenheidskomitee). The committee was to reconcile Ma-
lan’s HNP with the Ossewabrandwag and other nationalist factions. However, this 
effort was unsuccessful, which caused Du Plessis great disappointment and he pub-
licly accused both Malan and the leader of the OB Van Rensburg of shattering Afri-
kaner unity.56 But the Bond continued to influence the opposition so much that, as 
with the OB, the Smuts government decided to ban public servants from member-
ship in the Bond.57
51 DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, p. 351.
52 Membership in this organization was reserved for wealthy “white” Protestants who spoke 
Afrikaans fluently and regarded South Africa, as a nation with a unique language and cul-
ture, as their only homeland, see O’MEARA, p. 164; GILIOMEE, pp. 420–421.
53 VAN DER POEL, p. 499.
54 O’MEARA, p. 186.
55 Ibid., pp. 175–176; DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, p. 346.
56 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 15 (10.2.1942); DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, 
p. 352.
57 VAN DER POEL, p. 499.
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THE OSSEWABRANDWAG
A special chapter of the opposition to Smuts’ war cabinet consisted of non-parlia-
mentary nationalist groups and movements. Although the principal objectives of 
these groups, i.e. the defence of Afrikaner values, the cessation of participation in 
the war and the establishment of a republic independent of Britain were identical to 
those of Malan’s HNP, they differed in their methods of achieving these objectives. 
The general scepticism of these groups towards traditional democratic forms of par-
liamentary struggle was crucial to their choice of methods.58
Among these groups, the OB had a special position. It was exceptional in particu-
lar in its mass character; in 1941 the number of members reached approximately 300 
thousand, and also in the military format of the organization, which ensured the 
effective management of a movement whose members associated with simple nation-
alist slogans, rather than a real agenda.59
The main objectives of the movement can be characterized as follows: national 
unity replacing a multi-political party system with a concept called volkseenheid, 
ending participation in the war and declaring a republic.60 The volkseenheid concept 
gained many supporters among Afrikaners when Malan and his supporters left the 
National Party in 1934, after the break-up of the United Party in September 1939, and 
then during 1940, when a group of Hertzog supporters separated from the HNP to 
form the Afrikaner Party.61 These events led to the rejection of the traditional ar-
rangement of plurality of political parties and the parliamentary forms of political 
struggle by a large portion of Afrikaners. The Union’s participation in the war on the 
side of Great Britain was contrary to the national interests for many of them. Volk-
seenheid was to some extent inspired by fascism and Nazism, and an important part 
of it was the principle of leadership.62 However, support for Nazi Germany was not 
only at an ideological level, but also strongly pragmatic. The path to an independent 
republic logically led through the victory of Germany and its allies, resulting in the 
collapse of the British Empire.63
The OB was a very heterogeneous movement, whose members were associated 
by discontent rather than a positive agenda. On the one hand, there were those 
for whom the HNP’s programme and methods were too moderate (this was es-
pecially true of members from the Orange Free State), while on the other side of 
the spectrum there were a significant number of Hertzog’s supporters who were 
dissatisfied with the way Hertzog had been ousted from the HNP in 1940. In ad-
dition to the mainstream nationalists, some members of the OB were also mem-
bers of extreme right pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic groups, such as the Grey or Black 
58 SANDFA, IRBS No. 10 (14.10.1941); DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, p. 351.
59 The mass character of the OB is evidenced by the fact that approximately one in three 
adult Afrikaners was a member of this movement at this time.
60 MARX, C.: The Ossewabrandwag As a Mass Movement, 1939–1941, in: Journal of Southern Af-
rican Studies, Volume 20, No. 2 (June 1994), p. 196.
61 Ibid., p. 198.
62 GILIOMEE, pp. 434–444.
63 Ibid., p. 201; DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, p. 341.
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Shirts.64 With such diversity, OB members found common themes in sharing Af-
rikaner values and traditions (especially the Great Trek) and in the anti-British 
and anti-communist attitudes demonstrated at frequent mass gatherings, rather 
than in some structured political agenda. However, this does not mean that the OB 
stood outside the political arena. With its growth of membership base since 1940, 
it sought to create pressure on the leadership of the HNP in favour of the New 
Order, though the OB’s leadership wanted to create the perception that the OB was 
a supra-party movement.65 The leadership sought to combine this pressure with 
other non-parliamentary activities, such as mass meetings and the publication of 
pamphlets.
A turning point occurred in 1941, when radical leader Hans van Rensburg took the 
helm of the OB. He took an irreconcilable attitude towards the HNP and, in particu-
lar, D. F. Malan. Although Malan tried to find a common approach through the so-
called National Committee, which would bring together the HNP and other national-
ist groups, Van Rensburg very quickly rejected this proposal.66 While Van Rensburg 
accused Malan of betraying the idea of Afrikaner unity, Malan blamed his rival for 
allowing the OB to increasingly become a platform for national-socialist extremism.67 
This claim was fairly astute. The leader of the OB had repeatedly stated that he did 
not believe in the effectiveness of parliamentary struggle, but in a national-socialist 
revolution. According to him, Nazi Germany was not a danger to the Union in the war, 
but the spread of communism, and in the event of Germany’s defeat, he expected not 
Britain, but the Soviet Union, to be the victor.68
At that time, in the context of the subversive activities (even sabotage and terror-
ism) of certain OB components and the generally hostile attitudes of its members, 
the government proceeded to prohibit civil servants from OB membership. From the 
summer of 1941, OB activities, assemblies and training camps also became subject to 
more systematic attention from the police and intelligence services.69
The ban on OB membership for civil servants meant not only a major decline in 
membership in cities, but also the loss of essentially the only members with higher 
education in local organizations in rural areas, when state school teachers and civil 
servants had to leave the OB ranks under this regulation. The loss of civil servants 
and the considerable differences of opinion of the remaining members caused the 
relatively rapid erosion and decline of the OB. Van Rensburg oriented the move-
ment completely pro-Nazi, which led to a further deterioration in relations with the 
HNP.70 Moderate members also abandoned the OB. On the other hand some radical 
groups such as the Stormtroopers (Stormjaers) focused on violent actions, which fur-
64 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 13 (10.12.1941); IRBS No. 14 (16.1.1942).
65 DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, p. 351.
66 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 13 (10.12.1941); IRBS No. 14 (16.1.1942).
67 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 15 (10.2.1942); IRBS No. 16 (17.3.1942); 
IRBS No. 22 (9.11.1942).
68 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 21 (3.9.1942); IRBS No. 23 (28.12.1942)
69 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 7 (15.8.1941).
70 MARX, p. 216.
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ther damaged the reputation of the OB.71 This, together with the absence of a clear 
political agenda, led to the OB losing its influence on political developments in the 
Union.
GOVERNMENT MEASURES AGAINST  
THE ACTIONS OF THE OPPOSITION
To ensure security, the government imposed some major restrictions on the rights 
and freedoms of Union citizens and other persons within its territory and in the 
Mandated Territory of South-West Africa.72 It was forbidden, among other things, to 
oppose or not comply with any official regulations and measures issued in connec-
tion with the war, to encourage anyone to do so, to prevent recruitment to the UDF, to 
spread racial hate, panic or small-mindedness. The government also restricted free-
dom of speech and, of course, banned the dissemination of subversive propaganda.73 
Officials at the Ministry of Interior and Censorship were given the power to confis-
cate printed materials whose contents could threaten national defence and security. 
The government also gained the authority to determine that membership of certain 
organizations was incompatible with the civil service. Any riots and other activities 
aimed at disrupting permitted assemblies were prohibited; any unauthorized mil-
itary training was also declared illegal.74 Furthermore, there was a prohibition on 
damaging official notices and sealed notices of an official nature. In addition, the gov-
ernment could restrict or prohibit the movement of persons in certain areas impor-
tant for the defence of the Union. Members of enemy countries were not allowed to 
own radio equipment, and no one was allowed to listen to enemy radio broadcasts.75 
Strict restrictions were placed on the possession of weapons, ammunition and ex-
plosives. Citizens of enemy states in the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa 
(if they were not interned) had to in principle stay only in their usual residence and 
their movement was subject to a special permit issued by the local police.
Offences against security measures were dealt with by the courts in a summary 
procedure. Breaches of security restrictions were punishable by fines of up to £200 
or jail time of up to five years. Sabotage activities committed using explosives were 
punishable with a minimum five-year sentence. In response to growing sabotage 
71 Ibid., p. 216.
72 For example, State of Emergency Proclamation No. 201 of 1939, National Emergency Reg-
ulation 17 of 1939, National Emergency Regulation 19 of 1939, but in particular the com-
prehensive regulation provided by the National Security Regulations (War Measure No. 4 
of 1941).
73 It is therefore somewhat surprising that the government, especially in the early period of 
the war, was quite benevolent to the pro-Nazi propaganda of the nationalist opposition, 
which is described in more detail above.
74 Both the OB and some paramilitary nationalist organizations had a tradition of military 
camps for Afrikaner youth.
75 However, the effectiveness of this ban was questionable throughout the war, and a num-
ber of Afrikaners, including those who served in the UDF, regularly listened to the broad-
casts of a German radio station Zeesen.
88 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019
 activity, sanctions were tightened and in severe cases of sabotage using explosives, 
the death penalty could also be imposed in proceedings before special courts.76 But 
the courts mostly imposed sentences rather leniently, and death sentences (if any) 
were commuted by grace. Given that the vast majority of offences of illegal posses-
sion of weapons or explosives and, of course, sabotage were committed by Afrikaner 
nationalist extremists, the government’s lenience often provoked resentment among 
English speakers.77
The introduction of censorship and the establishment of the Office of the Chief Cen-
sor were extremely important measures at the beginning of the war. Censorship cov-
ered not only all correspondence, but also all printed material and radio broadcasting 
and film production.78 The police and other authorities were allowed to enter dwellings 
without a court order, carry out inspections and confiscate printed materials.79
For all military personnel, there were detailed censorship rules, which, among 
other things, prohibited the use of languages other than English or Afrikaans, or-
dered soldiers to send any correspondence only through designated censorship of-
ficers, and also to submit to them their private diaries and notes at specified intervals. 
Of course, soldiers were not allowed to provide certain military information in cor-
respondence and other materials.80
Civilians located in the Territory of the Union or the Mandated Territory of 
South-West Africa also had to comply with the censorship measures. It was strictly 
prohibited to send mail other than through the official postal service, as well as to 
give information whose disclosure could jeopardize the security of the Union or its 
war effort.81 However, censors recorded a significant number of infringements of 
these prohibitions, in particular as regards information relating to the movement of 
ships in South African ports, the location of troops in the Union and their transport 
to areas of overseas deployment. In most cases, however, it was sufficient to send 
a “Warning Card” to the persons concerned.82
Censorship of correspondence was not only a tool for ensuring the secrecy of sen-
sitive information, but also served (among other means) to monitor the mood and 
morale of the population and soldiers. The government was then able to respond to 
these findings with targeted propaganda.83
76 War Measure No. 13 of 1942 (Emergency Regulations that Provide for the Trial of Serious 
Cases of Sabotage by Special High Courts).
77 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS (1940–1943) cited from above; SANDFA, Box 
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78 Proclamation No. 201, 1939 — National Emergency Regulations.
79 E.g. Proclamation No. 201, 1939 — National Emergency Regulations, War Measure No. 4 
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81 See the regulations cited above.
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ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE UNION
The opposition movement was linked to the sabotage and subversive actions of op-
position groups and German covert operations within the territory of the Union 
during the early part of the war. The German intelligence service, Abwehr, was, of 
course, aware that the pro-Nazi orientation of some Afrikaner groups represented 
an opportunity to destabilize the Union’s war effort. And the conditions prevailing 
for this activity in the Union at the beginning of the war were favourable to these 
plans.
Moreover, Nazi Germany were able to follow up on intensive propaganda and 
information-gathering activities from before the outbreak of the war. The main 
tools of Nazi propaganda in this period were the press, various associations and 
organizations, the activities of missionaries and various exchange programmes of 
students and scientists. Representatives of German firms based in the Union were 
also active.84
Although the danger was obvious even before the outbreak of the war, as in 
other areas, the Union had entered into conflict with Germany completely unpre-
pared for counter-espionage and defence against enemy secret operations and 
sabotage. It is likely that the efforts to create a counter-espionage service were 
sabotaged by the pre-war Defence Minister Oswald Pirow, who was known for his 
sympathies with Nazi Germany.85 After the outbreak of the war, however, the sit-
uation began to change. The war cabinet was aware of the danger that the “fifth 
column” of German origin in particular in the Transvaal and Orange Free State and 
some other areas represented a risk to the security of the Union. Its actions were 
aimed not only at establishing a counter-espionage service within the UDF, but also 
at coordinating its efforts with the police forces and the creation of local units to 
monitor suspicious activity.86
Logically, the first measure against the danger of subversive activity was the 
expulsion of German diplomats and consular officials from the Union. They, nat-
urally, represented a major threat to the Union’s internal security.87 Although it 
was not certain until 6 September 1939 whether the Union would declare war on 
Germany, there had been vigorous correspondence between the government and 
diplomatic missions in Germany and neutral states and, of course, with the British 
Foreign Office since the beginning of the month, on possible action against Ger-
man diplomats and consular officials.88 First, however, it was essential to ensure the 
safe return of diplomats and staff of Union consulates in Germany in the event of 
84 F. L. MONAMA, Wartime Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939–1945, Dissertation, 
Stellenbosch University (April 2014), pp. 5–19.
85 K. FEDOROWICH, German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa 
and Mozambique, 1939–1944, in: The Historical Journal, Volume 48, No. 1 (March 2005), 
pp. 212–214.
86 Ibid., pp. 215–216.
87 SANDFA, UWH Box 279, file B.I.30, Memorandum related to Nazi Activities in the Union 
of South Africa (28.10.1939).
88 NAR, REF. 72/13/9, Part. 1, Various correspondence (4.–6.9.1939).
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the outbreak of war. The situation became more complicated when London asked 
Commonwealth governments, including the Union, to carry out reciprocal meas-
ures in their countries in response to the detention of British consular officials in 
Germany.89 Such steps would however put South Africans at risk of internment 
in Germany, and therefore the Union government, in an attempt to buy time, re-
sponded to this request rather evasively, even though the Union was already in 
a state of  war with Germany by that time and had severed diplomatic relations 
with it.90 After prolonged negotiations, all German diplomats, consular officials, 
employees and family members were eventually expelled from the Union, however 
the Union government guaranteed them safe passage to Germany via neutral coun-
tries.91 From that point on, German agents with diplomatic or consular cover op-
erated against the Union from neighbouring neutral countries, in particular from 
Mozambique.
From 1940, police and military counter-intelligence also began to monitor the ac-
tivities of various groups that could jeopardize internal security and the undisturbed 
operation of the war economy. Surveillance was not limited only to subversive groups 
suspected of preparing sabotage operations, but also extended to all opposition Afri-
kaner groups, including the HNP, OB and the New Order.92
In the context of the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, various commu-
nist groups were also the subject of surveillance, but after the Soviet Union entered 
the war, the risk of hostilities on their part was assessed as negligible.93
Another preventive measure taken by the government of the Union at the begin-
ning of the war was the continuous internment of unreliable persons, not only for-
eigners, but also Union citizens.94 However, many internees managed to escape with 
the help of OB sympathizers among the guard personnel of internment facilities, 
hiding for quite a long time, and some engaged in terrorist activities.95
Even in the early period of the war, the British Imperial Staff was aware of the 
importance of establishing structured ties with the UDF. In the field of counter-espi-
onage, however, this effort encountered a number of problems that seemed to have 
originated on the South African side. The main problem was not only that Britain’s 
MI5 regarded the Union’s counter-espionage service (both police and military) as in-
competent, but it also had serious doubts about the integrity of some high-ranking 
officers. Among them, Colonel Coetzee, a high-ranking police officer with a clearly 
anti-British stance, appeared to have “excelled” in this regard, and it was subse-
quently discovered that he was a member of the Bond. However, despite the initial 
problems, an MI5 branch was established as part of a British military mission under 
89 NAR REF. 72/13/9, Part. 1, Telegram No. 377, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Lon-
don’s Minister for External Affairs, Pretoria (8.9.1939). 
90 NAR REF. 72/13/9, Part. 1, Telegram No. 452, Minister for External Affairs, Pretoria’s Sec-
retary of State for Dominion Affairs, London (9.9.1939).
91 NAR REF. 72/13/9, Part. 1, Declaration by J.C. Smuts (26.9.1939).
92 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS (1941 to 1943).
93 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 7 (15.8.1941).
94 Proclamation No. 201, 1939 — National Emergency Regulations, Article. 15.
95 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22 IRBS (1941–1943).
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the command of Major Webster and his deputy Major Luke. Its main task was coun-
ter-espionage and anti-sabotage activities.96
From 1940, the primary target of South African counter-espionage and MI5 was 
the OB and its paramilitary division the Stormjaers. Although support for Smuts’ 
cabinet grew among the population in the early 1940s, there was a perfectly justi-
fied concern that the Axis’s military successes would not only encourage nationalist 
opposition, but that it could also cause those Union citizens who were still on the 
side of the war cabinet to join the opposition. The Stormjaers’ sabotage activities, 
which focused mainly on transport and communication infrastructure, also rein-
forced this concern. Moreover, there was evidence that the leader of the OB Van 
Rensburg was a German agent directing this sabotage activity. Sabotage and ter-
rorist activity peaked in early 1942.97 However, a number of actions were thwarted, 
and even in cases where the attacks had been successful, the damage done, with 
some exceptions, was not significant.98 Yet in response to increased sabotage and 
terrorist activity, the government decided to tighten sentences for the perpetrators 
caught and even impose the risk of the death penalty.99 Later, only isolated cases 
of terrorist attacks were reported, while others were either prevented or caused 
minor damage.100
The increasing frequency of violence and sabotage perpetrated by extreme na-
tionalists led Abwehr to prepare a bold plan to assassinate General Smuts. In June 
1941, the former South African boxing champion Robey Leibbrandt landed on the 
Atlantic Coast of the Union.101 His task consisted not only in carrying out this assas-
sination, but also in organizing terrorist and sabotage activities, including bank rob-
beries. Leibbrandt was betrayed, however, by the head of the OB Van Rensburg, who 
informed the police about the presence of this German agent in the Union. His likely 
motivation was probably that, to Van Rensburg’s mind, Leibbrandt had jeopardized 
the position of the OB and, by his recklessness, he could have compromised other 
German agents in South Africa.102 Robey Leibbrandt was arrested on 24 December 
1941 and along with seven accomplices brought before a court on charges of high 
96 FEDOROWICH, p. 219.
97 Ibid., pp. 221–222; SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 15 (10.2.1942).
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101 Leibbrandt, Robey (1913–1966) was a South African heavyweight champion who repre-
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eral Smuts, by grace, commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. After the 1948 elec-
tions, in which the HNP won, he and other wartime convicts were released from prison. 
He died in South Africa in 1966, see: http://www.leibbrandt.com/leibbrandt_archive/Sid-
ney_Robey_Leibbrandt/Boeke_waarin_RL.htm, [cit. 30.5.2020].
102 Van Rensburg and other officials repeatedly distanced themselves from violent actions 
and denied any connection between the Stormjaers and other terrorist groups. Howev-
er, these statements did not seem very credible to the authorities. See, for example, the 
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treason on 10 July 1942.103 More arrests followed, including within the ranks of the 
police.104
Abwehr, however, had a number of other agents in South Africa. Their number 
is estimated to have totalled 100. They were recruited not only from among German 
immigrants who managed to escape from internment with the help of OB members, 
but also from among other foreigners within the Union. Among them were, for ex-
ample, German communists released from concentration camps, as well as members 
of other foreign nations who lived within the territory of the Union.105 Among these 
alleged agents were also Czech citizens from the diplomatic corps and employees of 
the company Baťa.106
The activities of its agents in the Union were managed by the German intelligence 
service through its Consulate General in Mozambique. These operations were con-
sidered so dangerous by the British that the Special Operations Executive (SOE) even 
considered the assassination of German Consul General Paul Trompke.107
The tasks carried out by German agents were primarily of an intelligence gath-
ering nature. Among other things, with the help of OB sympathizers, they provided 
information on the movement of ship transports, which were then used to plan the 
attacks of German submarines in the area. Other activities of the agents focused on 
propaganda and support for sabotage. MI5, like the South African authorities, at-
tempted to intercept these agents with varying degrees of success. The activities of 
German agents weakened from 1943 onwards due to the weakening of OB and the 
suppression of militant pro-Nazi groups.
1943 WAR ELECTIONS
The war general elections were held on 7 July 1943.108 The internal political and inter-
national situation was relatively favourable to the United Party and its allies since 
the opposition entered the election year unconsolidated. Pirow’s New Order, like the 
Afrikaner Party led by Nicolaas Havenga, had finally broken with Malan,109 and the 
 commission’s report on the use of information provided by the authorities. SANDFA, AI, 
GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 15 (7.2.1942) and IRBS No. 20 (23.7.1942).
103 SANDFA, Box 23, File (10) I 21(A), IRBS No. 20 (23.7.1942).
104 FEDOROWICH, pp. 222–223.
105 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 2 (16.4.1941).
106 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 5 (26.6.1941).
107 FEDOROWICH, p. 225. Paul Trompke was in touch with a number of opposition leaders 
and was informed in detail of their activities. See e.g. his report cited in footnote 47.
108 The term of the House of Assembly was for five years and the government had no author-
ity to alter this term by means of statutory measures (War Measures (Amendment) Act 
No. 32 of 1940, Art. 3 (b)). 
109 Nicolaas Havenga publicly accused Dr Malan that his goal is to become the sole leader of 
the Afrikaner opposition rather than winning the upcoming elections. Oswald Pirow did 
not even run in the elections and stated that he did not believe in parliament, but only 
in [national socialist] revolution, see SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File(10) I 22, IRBS No. 31 
(23.7.1943).
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OB had officially taken a neutral “cross-party” position, but its leadership had been 
highly critical of D. F. Malan. The militant groups took a totally hostile stance against 
the HNP after Malan condemned their sabotage and criminal activities. Plans to con-
solidate non-HNP political forces and create an alternative to the HNP failed in 1943, 
making the Malanites the only politically relevant opposition force in the upcoming 
election fight.110
Germany and its allies’ position in the war deteriorated rapidly. The Allies suc-
cessfully ended their campaign in North Africa and were preparing to land on Italian 
soil, there was also a turnaround both on the Eastern Front and in the Pacific. It was 
therefore more than likely that the orientation of opposition forces to an Axis victory 
in the war did not have a realistic basis.
As the elections approached, it became increasingly clear that this would be a duel 
between Smuts’ United Party and Malan’s HNP. The coalition parties — the Labour 
Party and the Dominion Party — focused on retaining their current seats rather than 
competing for new seats in the House.111 Given the fragmentation of the nationalist 
opposition, it was almost certain that the candidates of Oswald Pirow’s New Order 
and the Afrikaner Party led by Nicolaas Havenga did not have much chance. Election 
polls were more favourable to the United Party, which, unlike the HNP, appealed to 
a large proportion of English-speaking voters and predicted a similar gain to that 
in the last pre-war elections in 1938.112 As expected, the main theme of the election 
was the ongoing participation in the war. However, the HNP also addressed voters 
with more general themes, such as the future of the Union as a racially segregated 
state independent of Britain, the need to improve the economic and social condi-
tions of Afrikaners, and the dangers of the spread of communism. To some extent, 
anti-Semitic rhetoric also emerged.113 The United Party and its coalition partners, on 
the other hand, appealed to voters with a call to support the war effort and a moral 
appeal to fight Nazism.114
The opposition suffered an expected defeat in the July 1943 elections. However, its 
defeat was far more pronounced than even Smuts himself had expected.115 National-
ists won only 43 seats, while Smuts’ United Party won 89 seats and its coalition part-
ners the Labour Party 9 and the Dominion Party 7. The Afrikaner Party of support-
ers of the late opposition leader General Hertzog, led by Nicolaas Havenga, received 
just under two percent of the vote and remained unrepresented in the House.116 The 
New Order’s independent candidates also failed. This gave Smuts’ new war cabinet 
a comfortable parliamentary majority without the need for coalition partners. An 
110 DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, pp. 352–353; SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS 
No. 25 (1.3.1943). 
111 Rand Daily Mail (26.4.1943)
112 The Star (31.5.1943)
113 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I 22, IRBS No. 31 (23.7.1943).
114 SANDFA, Box 241, File (10) B.I.3, Rand Daily Mail (11.6.1943, 23.6.1943), The Star 31.5.1943, 
1.6.1943).
115 VAN DER POEL, p. 446.
116 More detailed results available at: http://africanelections.tripod.com/za.html#1943_
House_of_Assembly_Election, [cit. 30.5.2020].
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important factor in Smuts’ significant victory was, among other things, the fact that 
UDF members, including those serving overseas, for the first time had the right to 
vote.117 It is assumed that the majority of voting soldiers supported General Smuts in 
the election. 
But the results of the 1943 elections can also be seen from a different perspective 
than the United Party’s convincing victory. The opposition lost 23 seats in the House 
of Assembly in total, but those losses came at the expense of the Afrikaner Party 
and the independent candidates of Pirow’s New Order. However, the HNP, as the 
successor to the pre-war GNP, won 16 new seats compared to the 1938 elections.118 The 
HNP became the only opposition political party with representation in the House 
of Assembly and in the new parliamentary term it pragmatically dropped the topic 
of ending the state of war. It turned out that breaking with radical pro-Nazi groups 
such as Pirow’s New Order and the OB, and its shift to broader issues, particularly 
appeals against the dangers of communism and the racial question, were the “right” 
choice.119
CONCLUSIONS
Smuts’ first war cabinet had to deal not only with the country’s complete unprepar-
edness for the conflict, and the failures of the anti-Hitler coalition on the battlefield, 
but (unlike most warring states) also with a large, though fragmented, opposition 
sabotaging its war effort. All Smuts’ attempts to re-establish “white unity” failed.
For the nationalist opposition, this was a period marked by the diversity of in-
dividual concepts and currents and the inability to agree on a common vision. It 
also failed to unite, but further developments led to the consolidation of national-
ists under Malan’s leadership and the marginalization of its competitors. The war 
elections of 1943 were marked by nationalist opposition against the United Party 
and Smuts’ policies, the end of the stage when various opposition groups focused 
only on political struggle, and agitation against participating in the war against 
Germany (of course contrary to other countries for different than pacifist reasons), 
which in many cases even involved embracing violent actions threatening the war 
effort and cooperation with Nazi Germany. The development of the war in favour of 
the anti-Hitler coalition however diminished the hopes of defeating Great Britain 
and the immediate disintegration of the British Empire. After the war elections, 
Prime Minister Smuts might have considered the opposition totally defeated. Its 
representation in the House was so weak that it did not represent a serious obstacle 
to his second war cabinet.
However, this period of United Party dominance lasted only one parliamentary 
term. Further developments have shown that not only Smuts’ complacency and mis-
takes in domestic and foreign post-war politics, but above all, the focus of Malan’s 
117 Active Service Voters Act No. 37 of 1941 and War Service Voters Act No. 34 of 1943.
118 More detailed results available at: http://africanelections.tripod.com/za.html#1938_
House_of_Assembly_Election, [cit. 30.5.2020].
119 DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, p. 353.
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HNP on the issue of the future form of racial segregation, the improvement of the 
position of Afrikaners, and the danger of the spread of communism, appealed to vot-
ers better than anti-war and pro-Nazi rhetoric. Over the next five years, the HNP con-
solidated its status as the main opposition force, and in the first post-war elections in 
May 1948, it achieved (even for Malan himself) a surprise victory. And it maintained 
its position as the ruling political force until South Africa’s first democratic elections 
in 1994.
